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Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: 
Evidence from Korea 
 
 
Abstract: This article examines the empirical relation between CEO turnover and 
earnings management in Korea using a sample of 317 CEO turnovers and 634 non-
turnover control firms during the period of 2001-2008. We classify CEO turnovers into 
four types depending on whether the departure of outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced 
and the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We 
measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities 
management. We also control for the potential endogeneity of CEO turnover using 
Heckman’s two-stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance 
and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO 
only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new 
CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary 
accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new 
CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following 
the peaceful departure of predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not 
find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO. 
 
Keywords: CEO turnover, earnings management, financial performance, corporate 
governance, Korea Stock Exchange 
 
                                            
1 JONG-SEO CHOI is a Professor in the College of Business, Pusan National University, South Korea. 
YOUNG-MIN KWAK is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Accounting, Dongguk University, 
South Korea. CHONGWOO CHOE is a Professor in the Department of Economics, Monash University. 
The first author acknowledges the financial support by the National Research Foundation of Korea 
funded by the Korean government for 2012 program year (KRF: 2012S1A5A2A01019634). Please send all 
correspondence to: Chongwoo Choe, Department of Economics, Monash University, PO Box 197, 
Caulfield East, VIC, Australia; (Email) Chongwoo.Choe@monash.edu; (Tel) +61 3 9903 4520; (Fax) 
+61 3 9903 1128.  
  
2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Corporate executives have diverse incentives to manage their firms’ reported 
financial performance. They may do so to increase their compensation that is tied to 
accounting earnings, to benefit from stock sales when market reacts favourably to 
abnormally high accruals, to avoid separation and keep incumbency rents, to send 
better signals to market that can help their career, or to gain operational flexibility and 
control. Earnings can be managed either through discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991; 
Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Kothari et al., 2005) or by altering the 
timing of real transactions such as advertising or R&D activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). A large body of literature provides 
evidence of earnings management in various contexts including proxy contests, 
corporate takeovers, CEO turnover, and IPO.2 
CEO turnover provides an especially rich context for earnings management since 
it involves decisions by both the departing and incoming CEOs, and their incentives 
and opportunities to manage earnings may vary depending on the types of turnover. 
The departing CEO may try to inflate earnings to mask poor performance, to obtain a 
higher bonus in his last years on the job, or to obtain directorships or better 
employment after retirement. The incoming CEO may want to decrease earnings in his 
first year – the so-called big bath – to blame the predecessor’s poor performance. 
Indeed much of the existing studies find upward earnings management prior to the 
outgoing CEO’s departure and/or downward earnings management by the incoming 
CEO (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Pourciau, 1993, Brickley et al. 1999; Reitenga and 
Tearney, 2003; Conyon and Florou, 2004).3 Studies based on Australian data also 
provide evidence in support of a big bath, but there is little evidence of earnings 
management by the departing CEO (Wells, 2002; Godfrey et al., 2003; Wilson and 
Wang, 2010).  
Although the above studies often distinguish between routine and non-routine 
departures, their results do not separate whether the incoming CEO is through internal 
promotion or external recruitment. The specific context of CEO turnover is likely to 
have different implications for earnings management by both the departing and 
                                            
2 See Healy and Wahlen (1999), Dechow et al. (2010) or Ronen and Yaari (2010) for a comprehensive 
survey, and Verrecchia (2001), Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) or Beyer et al. (2010) for related 
theoretical issues. Wilson (2011) provides a survey on the evidence from Australia. 
3  DeAngelo (1998) reports similar findings in proxy contests. Pourciau (1993) reports income-
decreasing accruals by the outgoing CEOs in non-routine departures, possibly an attempt to reverse 
previously inflated accruals. 
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incoming CEOs. For example, the retiring CEO in a routine departure would have less 
incentive to manage earnings upward compared to the CEO who is forced to leave due, 
for example, to poor performance. Likewise, the internally groomed candidate who 
succeeds the predecessor in a routine departure would have less incentive to blame the 
predecessor compared to when the departure has been triggered by poor performance. 
The extent to which the new CEO can manage earnings would also depend on whether 
or not the departing CEO remains on the board and curbs opportunistic earnings 
management by the new CEO. Consequently, a further refinement of turnover types 
beyond routine versus non-routine departures is likely to provide new insight to 
earnings management surrounding CEO turnover.  
An additional issue in detecting earnings management by the departing CEO is 
potential endogeneity since both earnings management and CEO turnover are likely to 
be associated with poor firm performance.4 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) argue 
that, since firm performance and turnover are negatively associated while firm 
performance and the discretionary variables are positively correlated, turnover and the 
discretionary variables are likely to be negatively correlated. However, one cannot 
infer that the negative association between turnover and the discretionary variables is 
due to the outgoing CEO’s discretion; such an inference would be valid only after 
controlling for the structural relation between firm performance and the discretionary 
variables. Omitting firm performance in estimating the earnings management equation 
results in the correlated omitted variables problem, causing the coefficient on turnover 
to be biased. 5  Corporate governance is another potential source of endogeniety 
problem. Firms with robust governance system are more likely to discipline poorly 
performing CEOs and less likley to be subject to earnings management (Reitenga and 
Tearney, 2003; Xie et al., 2003; Conyon and Florou, 2004; Faleye et al., 2011). 
The purpose of this paper is to address the above issues by classifying CEO 
turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure is peaceful or forced, and 
the succession is through internal promotion or external recruitment, at the same time 
tackling the endogeneity problem. The four types of CEO turnover are: peaceful 
                                            
4 Earnings management may also trigger CEO departure although the evidence is mixed. Beneish (1999) 
and Agrawal et al. (1999) do not find that manipulation increases turnover while Desai et al. (2006), 
Feroz et al. (1991), and Karpoff et al. (2008) provide evidence that restating firms do terminate their 
CEOs. More recently, Hazarika et al. (2012) report that the likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover 
are positively related to a firm’s earnings management, even after controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of CEO turnover and earnings management. 
5 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) use a simultaneous equations model where CEO turnover is an 
endogenous variable. However, since CEO turnover variable is defined as a dichotomous dummy 
variable, their estimation suffers from heteroscedasticity as well as the violation of the constraint that the 
predicted values lie between zero and one. 
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departure succeeded by an internally promoted candidate; peaceful departure combined 
with an externally recruited candidate; forced departure replaced by an internal 
candidate; and forced departure accompanied by external replacement. For each type, 
we examine the relation between CEO turnover and earnings management by both the 
departing and incoming CEOs. In doing so, we use Heckman’s two-stage approach 
(Heckman, 1979; Lee, 1979) to control for the possible endogeneity stemming from 
the linkage between corporate governance, firm performance and CEO turnover.6 We 
also consider whether the firm’s internal governance works to mitigate managerial 
opportunism under the context of CEO turnover. 
Our sample covers 317 cases of CEO turnover from 2001 to 2008 for large 
Korean companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. In each of the four turnover 
types, we investigate earnings management by the outgoing CEO in his last year and 
the incoming CEO in his first year in tenure. As measures of earnings management, we 
use both performance-matched discretionary accruals and real activities management. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, consistent with existing 
evidence, the departing CEO manages earnings upward when the departure is forced. 
However, such upward earnings management is significant only when the departing 
CEO is replaced by an internal candidate. Moreover, earnings management in this case 
is through discretionary accruals, not real activities management. Second, we do not 
find significant earnings management by the departing CEO in case of peaceful 
departure regardless of whether the successor comes from within or outside the firm. 
Third, the internal candidate who replaces the incumbent CEO who is forced to leave 
takes a big bath using both discretionary accruals and discretionary expenditures. We 
do not find evidence of big bath in case of peaceful departure. Fourth, the incoming 
CEO recruited from outside following the peaceful departure of predecessor tends to 
manage earnings upward using discretionary accruals. These results are robust after 
controlling for the potential endogeneity arising from the systematic relations among 
firm performance, governance system, and CEO turnover. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is the first study to 
our knowledge that examines earning management in the four types of CEO turnover 
described above. Second, we control for the endogeneity problem, which is a 
                                            
6 Albeit in different contexts, Heckman’s two-stage approach has been employed in several recent 
studies. It was used by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to study comparative loss recognition timeliness in 
the U.K., Oswald and Zarowin (2007) to control for the endogenous R&D choice in explaining 
differential future earnings response coefficients, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) in examining the changes 
in earnings quality surrounding IPO, and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) to investigate the factors that 
influence a firm’s decisions to manage earnings. 
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methodological improvement upon much of the existing studies on earnings 
management around CEO turnover. Third, this study provides the first comprehensive 
evidence from Korea on earnings management surrounding executive changes. The 
accounting environment in Korea provides a particularly interesting case to study 
earnings management. Many argue that the lack of accounting transparency was one of 
the potential culprits behind the financial crisis that hit hard the Korean economy in the 
late 1990s. Post-crisis reforms required that the Korean accounting community be 
ruled by the private sector standards-setting regime, benchmark the US model, and the 
business group firms have better corporate governance. Even after a series of far-
reaching market-based reforms, however, international recognition of Korean 
accounting standards did not change much. This led to the full adoption of IFRS to set 
the Korean accounting standards to be in line with high quality global standards. By 
focusing on earnings management during the period of turbulent accounting reforms in 
Korea, this study intends to provide rich implications for understanding managerial 
opportunism surrounding the critical moments of executive changes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses four 
types of CEO turnover and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 details our research 
design and Section 4 reports our main findings based on both univariate and 
multivariate analysis. We conclude the paper in Section 5 with some discussions. 
 
II. Hypotheses 
 
Our main hypotheses are that departing and incoming CEOs have different 
incentives and opportunities for earnings management depending on the context in 
which the turnover takes place. Specifically, we consider four types of CEO turnover 
based on whether the departure of CEO is peaceful or forced and the replacement is 
through the promotion of someone from inside the firm or recruitment from outside. 
The first type of turnover represents peaceful departure and internal succession. 
We argue that there are least incentives and opportunities for earnings management in 
this context. First, this scenario represents a typical routine turnover where there is 
little conflict of interest between the outgoing and incoming CEOs. It is because this 
type of turnover is most likely a ‘relay process’: a successor is chosen several years in 
advance of the anticipated retirement of the incumbent CEO and, during the transition 
period, power and authority are gradually handed over to the chosen replacement until 
the title of CEO is formally given to the successor (Vancil, 1987). Another possibility 
is the ‘horse race’ in which several contenders are identified early and engage in a 
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fairly open competition to determine who will become the next CEO (Pourciau, 1993). 
In addition, the outgoing CEO typically remains on the board and so is in a position to 
monitor the new CEO while the incoming CEO as an insider can closely monitor the 
outgoing CEO.7 Thus this type of turnover presents few opportunities for earnings 
management. In sum, the first type of turnover is structured in a way that minimizes 
moral hazard, providing less incentive and reduced opportunity for earnings 
management (Pourciau, 1993, p. 320). Thus we do not expect significant earnings 
management by either CEO in the first type of CEO turnover. 
The second type of turnover combines peaceful departure with external 
recruitment. Since this type of turnover is not typically triggered by poor performance 
and the outgoing CEO is likely to remain in the firm after departure, the incentive and 
the opportunity of the departing CEO to engage in opportunistic earnings management 
could be relatively limited. For the incoming CEO, the presence of departing CEO in 
the firm may limit the opportunity to take a big bath. On the other hand, the incoming 
CEO as an outsider may be subject to high expectations of the board and shareholders, 
which may pressure him to show good results from the beginning. Thus the incoming 
CEO may have incentives for upward earnings management. However, the new CEO 
as an outsider may not have much knowledge about the firm’s operation in the first 
year, which could limit the possibility of large scale earnings management. Thus in the 
second type of CEO turnover, we do not expect significant earnings management by 
the departing CEO but some upward earnings management by the incoming CEO. 
The third type of turnover combines forced departure with internal succession. 
This provides the strongest incentives for earnings management by both outgoing and 
incoming CEOs. This type of turnover is typically the result of poor firm performance 
accumulated over the years, which eventually leads to the forced resignation of a CEO. 
Under such circumstances, the outgoing CEO is likely to have incentives to improve 
performance to avoid or delay forced separation by resorting to upward earnings 
management. The incoming CEO, on the other hand, has incentives to take a big bath 
to blame the predecessor’s poor performance, thereby setting a low benchmark for his 
future performance evaluation and enhancing the possibility of dramatic turnaround 
during his tenure. Without the outoging CEO remaining on the board, the new CEO 
                                            
7 In our sample of 222 peaceful departures, outgoing CEOs remained in the firm or related companies in 
156 cases, which accounts for 70%. This is comparable to what Brickely et al. (1999) found from the US 
data. From their sample of 277 CEO departures during 1989-1993 for large US companies, they report 
that departing CEOs continued to serve on their own boards in 137 cases. Although they do not report 
the proportion of those remaining on their own boards out of 166 normal departures, their logit analysis 
shows that departing CEOs are more likely to remain on their own boards when departure is normal 
retirement rather than triggered by poor performance.   
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also has the opportunity for such earnings management. Thus we expect upward 
earnings management by the departing CEO and downward earnings management by 
the incoming CEO. 
The last type of turnover, forced departure combined with external replacement, 
is likely to represent the most dramatic turnover. It is often the result of merger, 
bankruptcy, and/or delisting (Kaplan and Minton, 2006). This situation typically 
requires a dramatic turnaround or shift in strategy, such as fundamental restructuring of 
business portfolios. Shareholders expect a bold move from the new CEO, who is likely 
to be an expert in the specific business area the company is looking forward to. The 
new CEO in this case may be too preoccupied with overall restructuring and 
refocusing of the firm, rendering earnings management secondary priority. Moreover, 
the opportunity for earnings management may be limited due to the high level of 
exposure to public and legal attention. Although the outgoing CEO has incentives for 
upward earnings management, dramatic structural changes may once again limit the 
opportunity for earnings management. In sum, both the incoming and outgoing CEO 
may have incentives for earnings management but the opportunity may be limited. 
Thus earnings management in this case may not be significant or is at best an empirical 
question. 
 
III. Research Design 
 
3.1 The Empirical model 
 
To tackle the endogeneity problem discussed previously, we use Heckman’s two-
stage approach. This approach is designed to control for the firm’s selection into CEO 
turnover on the basis of performance and governance structure. In the first stage, we 
use a probit model to estimate the probability of CEO turnover as a function of firm 
performance, corporate governance, and other control variables.  In the second stage, 
we regress various measures of earnings management on the types of CEO turnover 
after controlling for firm performance, corporate governance, and the inverse Mills 
ratio obtained from the first-stage regression. Specifically the model for the first-stage 
regression is: 
itijt
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where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is a dummy variable which equals 1 in case of CEO turnover, 
𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑃 denotes current and past firm performance, 𝐺𝐶𝐶 denotes various proxies of 
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corporate governance, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐶𝐶  stands for additional control variables, and 
subscripts index firm (i) and time (t). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 includes four different types of 
turnovers discussed in the previous section. Depending on the specific type of CEO 
turnover, the independent variables are likely to have different effects. For example, 
forced departure is likely to be more strongly associated with firm performance than 
peaceful departure. Similarly, when the CEO has significant share ownership, forced 
departure is less likely than peaceful departure. 
Our second-stage model is designed to capture the level of earnings management 
associated with a specific type of CEO turnover. 
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where 𝐶𝐸 is a continuous variable capturing the level of earnings management and 
𝐸𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀 is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage regression. Our focus is 
on the coefficient to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Since 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 1  in case of CEO turnover, 
significantly positive (negative)  𝛽1  indicates upward (downward) earnings 
management surrounding CEO turnover. We also include the interaction terms between 
𝐺𝐶𝐶 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. The estimated coefficients to the interaction terms represent the 
incremental effect on earnings management for turnover firms relative to non-turnover 
control firms: when upward earnings management is expected, significantly positive 
(negative) coefficients to the interaction terms indicate that governance structure tends 
to amplify (mitigate) the upward earnings management for the turn-over sample; in 
case of downward earnings management, the opposite is true. The interaction term 
between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  and 𝐸𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀 allows the coefficient to 𝐸𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀  to vary between 
turnover and non-turnover groups.8  
 
3.2 Variable Measurement  
 
3.2.1 Four Types of CEO Turnover  
 
We define CEO as someone who holds the highest rank in the list of full-time 
executives reported in the company’s quarterly and annual reports. As the focus of our 
study is on earnings management, we tried to make sure that the officer in ultimate 
                                            
8 Oswald and Zarowin (2007) include both terms and interpret that the endogeneity caused by selection 
bias is successfully controlled when the coefficients to these terms are statistically significant. 
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charge of the preparation of financial reports is designated as CEO. In cases of firms 
affiliated with large business groups, the founder-owner may exercise final control 
over all business affairs. Nevertheless, when the owner does not participate in business 
activities on a full-time basis regardless of the title attached, the separation of the 
owner from the title is not considered as a management change. By the same token, the 
resignation of a chairman of the board is not included as a CEO turnover unless the 
chairman also held the title of CEO. 
The year of CEO turnover, denoted by 𝑡 = 0, is defined as the first year the 
departing CEO does not have control over the firm’s annual financial statements. It is 
also the first year the incoming CEO has control over the annual financial statements.9 
The departing CEO’s last year in tenure, denoted by 𝑡 = −1, is identified as the last 
year when the CEO had been in the position throughout the year. If the date of turnover 
falls around the first quarter, the CEO is considered to have maintained the position 
throughout the entire last year. This approach is to identify the last year when the CEO 
had control over the annual financial statements that are issued during the first quarter 
of each year. On the other hand, the CEO departing around the end of the year would 
not likely have had input into discretionary accounting decisions affecting the financial 
statements in the following year. To confirm the exact date of turnover, we examined 
the company history, news articles, and disclosure of executive changes reported in 
individual company websites and the Financial Supervisory Service’s homepage.10 To 
check whether the names of CEOs have changed from previous year, we also 
compared the names of top executives that appear in quarterly reports of the year when 
the turnover took place. We confirm that over 90% of the executive changes in our 
sample are made public in general stockholders’ meeting in March. 
We follow Huson et al. (2001) and Jenter and Kanaan (2008) to identify if CEO 
departure is forced. If an article in the business press indicates that the CEO was fired, 
was forced to leave, or left following a policy disagreement, then the departure is 
identified as forced. When the CEO is under 60 and the article reporting the 
announcement of departure does not report the reason for the departure as involving 
death, poor health or acceptance of another position elsewhere, the departure is also 
classified as forced. Finally, departure due to a merger, bankruptcy, or delisting is also 
classified as forced. In all other cases, the departure is considered peaceful. The type of 
succession – internal or external – is determined by referring to executive information 
                                            
9 Control over annual financial statements is evidenced by the incoming CEO being in the position of 
CEO at the end of the first quarter following the year-end. 
10 http://english.fss.or.kr/fss/en/main.jsp. The website provides access to the electronic database of 
audited annual reports of Korean firms, referred to as DART system.  
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in the TS-2000 database and news article search.11 If the new CEO took the office by 
being promoted from inside the same or an affiliated company, then the case is 
classified as an internal succession; otherwise it is classified as an external succession. 
Based on these, we have four types of CEO turnover. Throughout the rest of the paper, 
type 1 turnovers refer to (peaceful departure, internal succession), type 2 turnovers 
refer to (peaceful departure, external recruitment), type 3 turnovers refer to (forced 
departure, internal succession), and type 4 turnovers refer to (forced departure, external 
recruitment). 
 
3.2.2 Earnings Management Metrics 
 
We examine earnings management during the last year of departing CEO’s 
tenure (𝑡 =  −1) and the first two years of new CEO’s tenure (𝑡 = 0, +1). Following 
prior studies, we measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real 
activities management. 
For discretionary accruals, we follow the cross-sectional models suggested by 
Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005). For each year we estimate the model 
for every industry classified by the two-digit Korean Standard Industry Code. Our first 
model is the modified version of Jones model as described by Dechow et al. (1995): 
itititititit PPEARSATAC εαααα ++∆−∆++= − 32110 )()/1(           (3) 
where ∆𝑀𝑖𝑖 and ∆𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑖 are the change in sales and accounts receivable respectively, 
scaled by lagged total assets, 𝐴𝑖𝑖−1, and 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑖 is net property, plant and equipment 
scaled by 𝐴𝑖𝑖−1. Also 𝐶𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑖 where 𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑀 is earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and CF is operating cash flow taken 
from the cash flow statement. Following Kothari et al. (2005), we also include a 
constant in the estimation. We use the residual from the regression model in (3) as the 
discretionary accruals, denoted by 𝐷𝐴𝐸𝐷. 
Our alternative measure of discretionary accrual is similar to the modified Jones 
model, except that it is augmented by including  𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑖−1 . Kothari et al. (2005) 
compare the effectiveness of two alternative ways of controlling for performance on 
measured discretionary accruals. In our paper, we choose the regression approach that 
includes the lagged 𝑃𝐶𝐴 as an additional regressor instead of the matched-firm 
approach. This is mainly due to limited sample size. The augmented version of 
                                            
11 TS-2000 stands for Business Information Total Solution 2000, which is a Korean version of CRSP 
database, developed by Korea Listed Companies Association. It provides financial information on KRX- 
and KOSDAQ-listed companies and industrial data. 
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accruals model as described by Kothari et al. (2005) is given below: 
.)()/1( 1432110 ititititititit ROAPPEARSATAC εβββββ +++∆−∆++= −−         (4) 
Our second measure of discretionary accruals is the residual from the regression model 
(4), denoted by 𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐷. 
For real earnings management, we follow Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), and consider three metrics of the abnormal levels of cash flow from 
operations, production costs, and discretionary expenses. We express normal cash flow 
from operations as a linear function of sales and change in sales in the current period as 
follows:12 
.)/1( 3211 ititititit SSACF εγγγ +∆++= −      (5) 
Production costs are defined as 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑀𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, where 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑀  is 
the cost of goods sold and ∆𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 denotes changes in inventory. Following Dechow 
et al. (1998), normal 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑀 is estimated as a linear function of contemporaneous sales, 
whereas normal inventory growth is estimated as a function of changes in sales in 
current and previous periods. Thus we estimate the normal level of production costs 
from the following industry-year regression: 
.)/1( 143211 itititititit SSSAPC εδδδδ +∆+∆++= −−           (6) 
The normal level of discretionary expenses can be expressed as a linear function 
of contemporaneous sales, similar to 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝑀.  However, modeling discretionary 
expense as a function of current sales creates a mechanical problem if firms manage 
sales upwards to increase reported earnings in a certain year, resulting in significantly 
lower residuals from running such a regression even when they do not reduce 
discretionary expenses (Roychowdhuri, 2006, p.345). To address this issue, we model 
discretionary expenses as a function of lagged sales and estimate the following model 
to derive the normal levels of discretionary expenses: 
itititit SADE ελλ ++= −− 1211 )/1(             (7) 
where 𝐷𝐶 represents the discretionary expenditure in period t, defined as the sum of 
advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and selling and administrative expenses.  
The abnormal cash flow, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are computed as the difference between actual values and the normal levels 
                                            
12 This model was developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and was implemented in Roychowdhury (2006). 
Subsequent studies including Cohen and Zarowin (2010) also rely on this model. 
12 
 
estimated from equations (5) to (7). We use these three variables as proxies for real 
earnings management:  𝑎𝑎𝐶𝑃  denotes the abnormal cash flow from (5), 𝑎𝑎𝑃𝐶 
denotes the abnormal production costs from (6), and 𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐶 denotes the abnormal 
discretionary expenditure from (7). For a given sales level, firms that manage earnings 
upwards are likely to have unusually low cash flow from operations, and/or unusually 
low discretionary expenses, and/or unusually high production costs.  
 
3.2.3 Corporate Governance Proxies 
 
To proxy the effectiveness of a firm’s corporate governance, we use a number of 
variables related to its ownership structure, board independence, affiliation with 
business group, and the characteristics of its external auditors. We define these 
variables below and offer some rationale for their inclusion in the study. 
First, we choose several governance proxies based on the firm’s ownership 
structure. CEOs with controlling stake in the firm may have more incentives and 
opportunities to manage earnings. On the other hand, block shareholders would want to 
prevent earnings management because the market discounts the value of firms 
suspected of earnings management. In addition, foreign owners tend to play an 
important role in monitoring management in Korea after the Asian Financial Crisis in 
the late 1990s (e.g., Chang and Shin, 2006). Thus our governance proxies based on 
ownership structure are: 𝐶𝐷𝐶 = 1 if the CEO is the largest shareholder, = 0, 
otherwise; 𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷 = 1 if the firm has one or more block-holders with more than 5% 
of the voting stock, = 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝐶𝑃 = the percentage of ownership held by foreign 
shareholders. 
Second, we use board independence as another proxy for corporate governance, 
which is standard in the literature: 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐶 = the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. 
Third, we consider affiliation with a major business group as an alternative 
measure of corporate governance. As noted by Khanna and Palepu (1999), a business 
group is an organizational form that functions as an effective monitor of its affiliates 
and provides an internal labor market that facilitates labor mobility when external labor 
markets are underdeveloped. In major Korean business groups such as Samsung, LG, 
and SK, group headquarters play the role of monitoring and disciplining top 
management of group-affiliated firms (Campbell and Keys, 2002; Chang and Shin, 
2006). The top business groups in Korea are called chaebols and are identified each 
year by the Korea Fair Trade Commissions based on the size of total assets. We 
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introduce a dummy variable to capture the affiliation in the top 30 business groups: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶 = 1 if the firm is affiliated with the top 30 business groups in a specific 
year, = 0, otherwise. 
Our last proxy for governance relates to a firm’s external auditors. Since external 
auditors attest to financial reports, they are probably the most important gatekeepers in 
blocking opportunistic earnings management, and higher quality audits are more likely 
to result in more conservative earnings. One measure of audit quality can be the size of 
audit firm either because larger auditors have more resources and can benefit from 
economies of scale (Danos and Eichenseher, 1982), or because they are also more 
concerned with their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981). Thus our last proxy for governance 
is defined as follows: 𝐸𝑀𝐺4 = 1 if the firm’s auditor belongs to one of the top four 
audit firms in Korea affiliated with the so-called Big Four comprising Samil, Samjung, 
Hanyoung, Anjin, = 0, otherwise. 
 
3.2.4 Firm Performance and Additional Control Variables. 
 
We use three alternative measures of corporate financial performance: industry-
adjusted ROA, industry-adjusted stock return, and sales growth.13 Industry-adjusted 
ROA is calculated by subtracting the median ROA of the industry from the firm’s ROA. 
Similarly, industry-adjusted stock return is calculated as the twelve-month return 
ending in three months after each fiscal year-end minus the contemporaneous equally-
weighted industry index return. Sales growth is measured as the percentage change in 
sales revenue. We include sales growth since, in the Korean business climate, gross 
sales has been traditionally considered to represent the relative status and success of 
the firm. Thus the three performance measures are: 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝐶𝐴 = firm ROA – median 
industry ROA during the same period; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑃 = stock return over twelve months – 
median stock return of the industry; 𝑀𝐺 = (sales in year t – sales in year t-1)/sales in 
year t-1. 
As additional control variables, we use leverage (𝐶𝐶𝐶) as measured by the ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets, firm size (𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶) as measured by a natural log of total 
assets, or sales (𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑀) where applicable. These variables are used in many prior 
studies such as Chang and Shin (2006) and Hazarika et al. (2012).  
 
                                            
13 We use industry-adjusted performance measures since it is common in Korea that management 
performance is evaluated relative to other competitors in the same industry (Chang and Shin, 2006). 
These measures have been used in many previous studies including Hazarika et al. (2012).  
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IV.Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our initial sample consists of 536 firm-year observations of CEO turnover during 
the period of 2001-2008 for firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange.14 Our primary 
sources of CEO turnover data are DART (Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer 
System), a database maintained by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), TS-2000 
database, and articles in business press. We also use KIS-VALUE and Fn-Guide 
databases for financial and market information, ownership structure, firm history, and 
other data necessary for our analyses. We check the consistency of CEO turnover data 
by referring to company websites and disclosures on DART submitted by individual 
firms. From the initial sample, we exclude a number of observations. First, we exclude 
24 observations from banking, finance and insurance industries to facilitate inter-
industry comparison. Second, we exclude 14 observations that do not have sufficient 
information to compute earnings management metrics described previously. Third, we 
exclude 65 observations where CEO turnover was implemented over two consecutive 
years since it is not possible to clearly identify the departing CEO’s last year in tenure 
and the incoming CEO’s first year in office. Fourth, we exclude 89 observations where 
there are fewer than 10 observations in any two-digit SIC code in any given year. This 
is intended to exclude observations for which the regression-model-based earnings 
management proxies are likely to be imprecise. Finally we exclude observations for 
which earnings management metrics exceed 3 standard deviations from the mean. 
These filters altogether yield a sample of 317 turnover observations. 
A profile of the turnover sample is presented in Table 1. The sample represents a 
fairly wide range of industry and types of CEO turnover. As shown in panel A, higher 
frequencies are observed in chemical, wholesale and retail, and electronic component 
industries. These industries are typically associated with larger number of firms and 
greater volatility in firm performance compared to other industries. In panel B, the 
sample is broken down to four sub-samples based on the types of CEO turnover. It 
shows that the largest number of turnovers (60.9%) can be described as a peaceful 
departure combined with an internal succession while a peaceful departure matched 
                                            
14 During 2001 – 2008, the number of listed firms varies from 683 to 756 and the number of CEO 
turnovers varies from 53 to 83. On average, about 9% of listed firms go through CEO turnover annually, 
which is comparable to the findings from the US where the annual rate CEO turnover is between 5% and 
15% depending on the period and the sample (Ronen and Yaari, 2010).  
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with an external succession occupies the smallest proportion (14.5%). It also shows 
that internal successions constitute about 75% of the sample.15 Finally we note most 
of the turnovers in top 30 chaebols are characterized by a peaceful departure and an 
internal succession reflecting relatively well-functioning internal labor markets: 
Korean chaebols are known to have well-developed internal systems to cultivate 
talented internal successors. 
  
<Insert Table 1 about here.> 
 
 For each turnover observation, we randomly match two non-turnover 
observations based on industry and firm size, leading to the overall sample of 951 
firm-years. Previous studies such as Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Pourciau 
(1993) employed the self-control approach whereby the years preceding the transition 
serve as a benchmark period. Since the incumbent CEO might attempt to manipulate 
earnings well before his departure, the self-control approach is not free from 
confounding effects. We believe the matched-sample methodology provides a better 
means of controlling for potential confounding factors. Other previous studies that 
used this methodology include Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2008), Desai et al. (2006), 
and DuCharme et al. (2004). The detailed information about the control sample is 
available from the authors.  
 In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A summarizes 
the information on firm performance, corporate governance proxies, and other control 
variables. Compared to those in the control group, firms in the turnover sample tend to 
have lower mean and median in all three measures of firm performance. As the 
significant difference in 𝐶𝐷𝐶,𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶  and 𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷  indicates, firms in the 
turnover sample are also more likely to be affiliated with chaebols, more likely to have 
large block ownerhsip, and less likely to have CEOs as the largest shareholder. For 
other variables, we do not find significant difference between the turnover and non-
turnover samples. In Panel B, we compare the five earnings management proxies 
between the two samples. We do not observe any discernible differences in these 
variables. A possible reason is that the mixture of different types of turnover in the 
turnover sample may obscure any clear distinction in earnings management behavior 
between the two groups of firms. 
                                            
15 The proportion of internal succession in Korea is slightly less than that in the US and Australia. Based 
on CEO departures in the US during 1974-1995, Agrawal et al. (2006) report that an insider succeeded 
the departing CEO in a little over 80% of the cases. From the sample of Australian CEO departures 
during 1984-1994, Wells (2002) finds that an insider succession accounts for 81.5%.  
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<Insert Table 2 about here.> 
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
 
In this section, we first provide univariate evidence on whether CEO turnover 
follows poor firm performance. We examine this by comparing the three performance 
measures for the two groups of firms for the period of 𝑡 =  −3 to 𝑡 = +1. Table 3 
provides the information and the results from the difference tests. As shown in the table, 
performance-related CEO turnover has strong support in all three measures of firm 
performance: performance measures are significantly lower for the turnover sample up 
to transition year (𝑡 = 0) but the difference becomes smaller or insignificant after the 
turnover.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here.> 
 
Next we examine if there are any differences in earnings management depending 
on the types of CEO turnover. The results are reported in Table 4. For each event year 
and the type of turnover, we conduct parametric t-tests for means and non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests for medians. We also conduct one-way ANOVA and Kruskal-
Wallis tests for the comparison of earnings management metrics among the four types 
of turnover.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here.> 
 
Panel A presents mean and median values of earnings management metrics at 
𝑡 =  −1. We find significantly positive abnormal accruals in type 3 turnovers, which 
result in significant differences in means and medians among the four types of turnover. 
For other types of CEO turnover, we do not find significant earnings management at 
𝑡 =  −1, both in discretionary accruals and in real activities manipulation. This implies 
upward earnings management in the last year of outgoing CEO’s tenure only when 
separation is forced and succession is internal. However we do not find significant real 
earnings management for type 3 turnovers, which suggests that it is difficult for the 
incumbent CEO to manipulate real activities to manage earnings in his last year due to 
intense monitoring by internally promoted successor and the board of directors. 
Panel B provides evidence on eanings management at 𝑡 = 0. Interestingly, we 
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find earnings management in opposite directions for type 2 and 3 turnovers. Type 2 
turnovers are associated with significantly positive earnings management using 
discretionary accruals. The absence of big bath in type 2 turnovers could be because of 
the peaceful nature of CEO turnover and the new CEO’s desire to meet the 
expectations of the board and shareholders. However, we do not find evidence on 
abnormal real activities presumably because, as someone coming from outside, the 
new CEO does not have sufficient knowledge about the real activities of the new firm. 
On the other hand, the new CEO in type 3 turnovers appears to take a big bath using 
accruals as well as discretionary expenditure on real activities such as R&D and 
marketing. This could be because the relationship between the predecessor and the 
successor in this case is one of rivalry: the departing CEO is dismissed due to poor 
performance and replaced by internal contender. Thus only type 3 turnovers offer 
evidence consistent with what is predicted by typical earnings management hypotheses. 
As shown in panel C,we do not find any significant earnings management at 𝑡 =  +1.  
In type 1 and 4 turnovers, we do not find any significant evidence on earnings 
management before and after the turnover. As for type 1 turnovers, we have argued in 
Section 2 that neither CEO has strong incentives for earnings management. In type 4 
turnovers, the incentives exist although opprotunity may be limited. We examined 
closely the 49 firm-year observations in type 4 turnovers in our sample and found that 
the majority were associated with business combinations or reorganization of troubled 
companies.16 As such, it is not surprising that we do not find significant discretionary 
accruals and/or abnormal real activities in type 4 turnover.  
To summarize Table 4, our findings show that significant earnings management 
is concentrated at 𝑡 =  −1 and 𝑡 = 0, and for type 2 and 3 turnovers. The departing 
CEO appears to engage in upward earnings management only when the departure is 
forced and the successor is promoted from within the firm. In this case, the new CEO 
tends to manage earnings downward, taking a big bath in the first year in office. In 
contrast, the new CEO recruited from outside after the peaceful departure of the 
predecessor appears to engage in upward earnings management. However, the 
univariate evidence does not tell us much about whether earnings management is 
driven by CEO turnover or by other confounding factors. We turn to this in the next 
section. 
 
                                            
16 Specifically, 37 cases represent turnovers under business combinations, 2 cases represent turnovers 
under workout of financially troubled companies, 2 cases are associated with the changes of statutory 
executives designated by the court, 2 cases represent the designation and dismissal of statutory CEOs by 
the court, and remaining 6 cases are related to business reorganizations.  
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4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 
We now estimate earnings management using Heckman’s two-stage approach. In 
the first stage, we use a probit model to estimate the probability of CEO turnover as a 
function of firm performance, various governance proxies, and control variables. We 
estimate equation (1) for each type of CEO turnover where we use both current and 
one-period lagged performance measures and 𝐶𝐶𝐶 as an additional control.17 The 
results are shown in Table 5. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
As expected, performance measures are negatively related CEO turnover and the 
relation is particularly pronounced for forced turnovers. The coefficient to 𝐶𝐷𝐶 is 
significantly negative in all types of CEO turnover for all measures of firm 
performance. The coefficient to 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶 is significantly positive only in type 1 
turnovers, reflecting the fact that large business groups tend to rely on internal labor 
markets for orderly executive changes. The presence of block shareholders also 
increases the likelihood of CEO turnover in all types of CEO turnover, confirming the 
role of block ownership as an effective monitoring mechanism. There is also some 
indication that foreign ownership increases the probability of CEO turnover. Finally, 
firms with higher leverage are more likley to undergo forced departure combined with 
external replacement. This is not surprising since the majority of turnovers in this case 
are associated with business combinations or reorganization of troubled companies.  
Our second-stage regression is based on equation (2), which includes the inverse 
Mills’ ratio obtained from each of the four first-stage probit models. As control 
variables, we include 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶 , 𝐶𝐶𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶𝐴 , and 𝐸𝑀𝐺4 . To control for the accrual 
reversal effect, we also include 𝐶𝐴𝐺 𝐶𝐴𝐶, total accrual of the previous period, which 
uses discretionary accrual as a dependent variable. We estimate equation (2) for each of 
the four types of CEO turnover at 𝑡 =  −1 and 𝑡 = 0.  We do not report the results 
for 𝑡 = +1 since earnings management by the incoming CEO is mostly concentrated 
at 𝑡 = 0, as found from the univariate analysis.18 For the measure of discretionary 
accruals, we only use 𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐷 since it is considered to be an improvement from 
                                            
17 Another control, 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶 , turns out to be strongly correlated with 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶. So we have omitted it to 
avoid multicollinearity in the probit model. Also we do not include 𝐸𝑀𝐺4 since the quality of auditor is 
more likely to be related to earnings management rather than CEO turnover, although it may affect CEO 
turnover through its effect on earnings management. 𝐸𝑀𝐺4 is included in the second-stage regression.  
18 The results for 𝑡 = +1, available from the authors, indeed show that coefficients to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 are 
insignificant in all types of CEO turnover.  
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𝐷𝐴𝐸𝐷.19 The results are reported in Tables 6 to 9, each table corresponding to each 
type of turnover. 
Table 6 reports the results for type 1 turnovers, peaceful departure combined with 
internal succession. As previously discussed, there is little conflict of interest between 
the outgoing and incoming CEOs in this case. Thus we do not expect CEO turnover to 
be a main driver of earnings management, if any. Indeed we do not find any significant 
coefficient to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 regardless of the earnings management metric and the event 
year. This is consistent with the results observed in the univariate analysis. The 
coefficients to two governance proxies, 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶 and 𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷, are significantly 
negative for both groups of firms, which implies that firms affiliated with large 
business groups or under the influence of block shareholders tend to manage earnings 
more conservatively. The negative effect is amplified for the turnover sample as 
indicated by the negative coefficients to the interaction terms. 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶 is negatively 
associated with earnings management while 𝐶𝐶𝐶 is positively related, consistent with 
the findings in the existing literature.20 The coefficients to the Mills ratio and its 
interaction term are significant, confirming the effectiveness of controlling for 
endogeneity of turnover variable. 
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Table 7 presents the results for type 2 turnovers, peaceful departure combined 
with external recruitment. Again, similar to the results from the univariate analysis, 
only the incoming CEO appears to manage discretionary accruals upward: the 
coefficient to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  is significantly positive only at 𝑡 = 0  and only when 
earnings management is measured by 𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐷. The coefficient estimates for 𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷, 
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶 have the same signs as in type 1 turnovers. 
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
Table 8 reports the results for type 3 turnovers, forced departure combined with 
internal succession. The results are arguably most consistent with the typical 
description of earnings management by outgoing and incoming CEOs: the outgoing 
CEO manages earnings upward while the incoming CEO takes a big bath. The 
coefficient to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 at 𝑡 =  −1 is significant and positive when 𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐷 is used 
                                            
19 The results using 𝐷𝐴𝐸𝐷 are quite similar and are available from the authors.  
20 See, for example, Healy and Whalen (1999), Fields et al. (2001), or Ronen and Yaari (2010). 
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as a dependent variable, implying that the outgoing CEO chooses upward earnings 
management using discretionary accruals in his last year. On the other hand, the 
coeffcient to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 at 𝑡 =  0 is significant and negative for both 𝐷𝐴𝐷𝐷 and 
𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐶. This suggests that the incoming CEO engages in downward earnings 
management using discretionary accruals as well as discretionary charges such as R&D 
and advertising expenses in the first year in office, supporting the big-bath hypothesis. 
The coefficients to 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐶 and 𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷 continue to be significant and negative, 
and so are the coefficients to their interaction terms with 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶. Thus upward 
earnings management by the outgoing CEO is partly mitigated under the presence of 
group headquarters and block shareholders. The coefficients to 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶 have 
the expected signs as before.  
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
Table 9 provides the results for type 4 turnovers, forced departure combined with 
external recruitment. As discussed previously and confirmed in the univariate analysis, 
this type of turnover is generally associated with financial trouble or business 
restructuring, which heightens the level of public surveillance over the firm. Therefore 
it is hard to expect opportunistic earnings management by either CEOs. The results 
reported in the table corroborate this. The coefficient to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is not significant in 
all cases although  𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷 ,  𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶,  and 𝐶𝐶𝐶continue to have the same effect on 
earnings management as in other types of CEO turnover. 
 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Using a sample of executive changes in large Korean corporations during the 
period of 2001-2008, this paper has examined earnings management surrounding CEO 
turnover. Our study adds to the existing literature on the subject in several ways. First, 
we have proposed four types of CEO turnover depending on whether the departure of 
outgoing CEO is through a peaceful or forced process and the appointment of new 
CEO is through internal promotion or external recruitment. The rationale for such a 
classification is that each turnover type represents different incentives and 
opportunities for both the departing and incoming CEOs. Second, by employing 
Heckman’s two stage approach, we explicitly address the problem of endogeneity of 
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CEO turnover that arises from the interrelations among CEO turnover, firm 
performance, corporate governance, and earnings management. Third, our paper is the 
first comprehensive study to our knowledge that provides evidence on the relation 
between CEO turnover and earnings management in the Korean context. 
We recapitulate our main findings. First, the departing CEO manages earnings 
upward only when he is forced to leave and succeeded by an insider. Earnings 
management in this case is through discretionary accruals, not real activities 
management. In all other cases, we do not find significant evidence of earnings 
management by the departing CEO. Second, the insider who replaces the CEO who is 
forced to leave takes a big bath using both discretionary accruals and discretionary 
expenditures. We do not find evidence of big bath by the internally promoted CEO in 
case of peaceful departure. Third, the incoming CEO recruited from outside following 
the peaceful departure of predecessor tends to manage earnings upward using 
discretionary accruals. But we do not find evidence of earnings management by the 
externally recruited CEO following the forced departure of predecessor. In addition, 
our results from multivariate analysis show that CEO turnover is systematically 
associated with firm performance and governance structure. Specifically, CEO 
turnover is negatively related to firm performance and CEO ownership regardless of 
the types of CEO turnover, and positively related to the firm’s affiliation with business 
group and the presence of block shareholders. The latter two are also shown to mitigate 
opportunistic earnings management. 
We conclude the paper with some discussions for future work. First, as 
demonstrated by Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2007), the 
incentives for upward earnings management by the departing CEO seem clear in case 
of non-routine turnover. The cover-up, the horizon problem, and the post-horizon 
problem are all relevant in this case (Ronen and Yaari, 2010). But even in peaceful 
departure, the horizon and post-horizon problems matter although our findings do not 
lend support to this hypothesis. The answer could be found if we had more detailed 
information on the departing CEO’s compensation at the time of separation and post-
retirement career. Second, that the externally recruited CEO in case of peaceful 
turnover manages earnings upward needs better understanding. Our conjecture was 
that the new CEO as an outsider may want to meet the high expectation of the board 
and shareholders and therefore try to show good results from the beginning. But the 
reason why this is not the case for the internally promoted CEO begs clarification. To 
say the least, we need information on whether and how the compensation contract is 
qualitatively different for the internally promoted CEO and externally recruited CEO. 
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Third, our focus in this paper was on earnings management as a response to the board’s 
decision to change executives. But the causal relation may exist in the other direction 
as in Hazarika et al. (2012). We leave these issues for future work. 
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Table 1: Profile of CEO Turnover Sample 
 
Panel A: Distribution by industry 
Industry Number of turnovers Industry 
Number of 
turnovers 
Basic metal 24 Vehicles 26 
Rubber and plastic 10 Electrical equipment 12 
Other machinery and equipment 14 Professional services 11 
Wholesale, retail 32 Electronic component 31 
Non-metallic 14 Construction 30 
Textile,clothing 19 Pulp and paper 19 
Food 18 Chemical 43 
Medicine 14 
  
  
Total 317 
Panel B: Distribution by turnover type 
Type of turnovers 
 
Number of turnovers 
Departure Succession 
 
Top30 business groups Others Total (%) 
Peaceful Internal 
 
70 123 193 (60.9) 
Peaceful External 
 
3 26 29 (9.1) 
Forced Internal 
 
13 33 46 (14.5) 
Forced External 
 
2 47 49 (15.5) 
Total 
 
88 229 317 (100) 
 
27 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
           Turnover Sample 
 
Non-turnover Sample Difference Tests 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max t-statistics z-statistics 
Panel A: Firm Characteristic Variables 
adjROA -0.023 0.130 -1.628 -0.019 1.026 
 
0.000 0.118 -1.045 -0.001 1.208 -2.53*** -2.24** 
SG 0.054 0.198 -0.679 0.046 1.583 
 
0.069 0.175 -0.247 0.065 0.417 -2.18** -2.03** 
adjSR 0.005 0.228 -1.632 0.004 1.145 
 
0.038 0.209 -1.016 0.026 1.328 -2.01* -1.74* 
SIZE 19.617 1.493 15.467 19.475 25.178 
 
19.524 1.274 16.193 19.606 23.288 1.59 0.68 
LEV 0.522 0.224 0.077 0.533 2.034 
 
0.444 0.194 0.022 0.445 1.495 0.72 -0.29 
OWN 0.190 0.393 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 -5.87*** -5.07*** 
CHAEBOL 0.278 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
0.173 0.378 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.93* 2.19** 
OUTSIDE 0.322 0.163 0.000 0.286 0.727 
 
0.314 0.141 0.000 0.271 0.750 0.69 0.43 
BLOCK 0.146 0.342 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
0.105 0.354 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.74* 2.21** 
FOR 0.059 0.073 0.000 0.031 0.727 
 
0.054 0.086 0.000 0.036 0.815 1.32 1.27 
BIG4 0.605 0.489 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 1.000 -1.07 0.84 
Panel B: Earnings Management Proxies 
DAMJ 0.002 0.098 -0.442 0.000 0.397 
 
0.006 0.088 -0.443 0.006 0.403 -0.86 -1.01 
DAKW -0.001 0.089 -0.411 -0.000 0.366 
 
0.002 0.082 -0.382 0.001 0.409 -0.63 -0.27 
abCF 0.002 0.080 -0.449 0.001 0.396 
 
0.000 0.075 -0.413 -0.011 0.381 0.94 0.39 
abPC 0.003 0.088 -0.328 0.004 0.427 
 
-0.001 0.086 -0.376 -0.004 0.397 1.22 1.42 
abDE 0.003 0.076 -0.321 0.003 0.321 
 
-0.000 0.072 -0.424 0.003 0.439 1.16 0.73 
Note: The difference tests are based on parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover 
 
Years around  
CEO turnover 
Turnover sample Non-turnover sample Difference tests 
n Mean Median n Mean Median    t-stat   z-stat 
Panel A : Industry-adjusted ROA 
-3 310 -0.0206 -0.0187 634 -0.0021 -0.0013     -3.01*** -2.35*** 
-2 314 -0.0224 -0.0199 634 -0.0018 -0.0010 -3.26*** -2.46*** 
-1 317 -0.0307 -0.0261 634 0.0002 -0.0001 -4.18*** -3.23*** 
0 317 -0.0182 -0.0144 634 -0.0004 -0.0002 -2.74*** -2.18** 
+1 317 -0.0154 -0.0128 634 0.0006 0.0004 -2.03** -1.71* 
Panel B : Sales growth 
-3 310 0.0359 0.0329 634 0.0672 0.0589 -2.28** -2.18** 
-2 314 0.0475 0.0417 634 0.0694 0.0621 -1.97** -2.01** 
-1 317 0.0466 0.0438 634 0.0698 0.0659 -2.02** -2.03** 
0 317 0.0477 0.0434 634 0.0685 0.0629 -1.98** -1.79* 
+1 317 0.0668 0.0635 634 0.0672 0.0661 -1.55 -1.02 
Panel C : Industry-adjusted stock return 
-3 310 -0.0286 -0.0191 634 0.0372 0.0365 -3.29*** -2.95*** 
-2 314 -0.0024 -0.0013 634 0.0298 0.0283 -2.63*** -2.92*** 
-1 317 0.0014 0.0009 634 0.0368 0.0300 -1.96** -1.67* 
0 317 -0.0022 -0.0017 634 0.0397 0.0326 -3.36*** -2.43*** 
+1 317 0.0170 0.0165 634 0.0353 0.0312 -1.14 1.29 
Note: The difference tests are based on parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Results of Difference Tests in Earnings Management around CEO Turnover 
 
 
Type 1 
(n = 193) 
Type 2 
(n = 29) 
Type 3 
(n = 46) 
Type 4 
(n = 49) Difference test 
Variables Mean (p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) F-value Chi-sq 
Panel A. Earnings management in year t = -1  
DAMJ 0.003 (0.56) 
0.003 
(0.45) 
0.002 
(0.83) 
0.003 
(0.57) 
0.022*** 
(0.00) 
0.023** 
(0.00) 
0.010 
(0.14) 
0.009 
(0.11) 15.66*** 11.78*** 
DAKW 0.004 (0.34) 
0.004 
(0.36) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
0.003 
(0.65) 
0.017** 
(0.02) 
0.015** 
(0.04) 
0.009 
(0.10) 
0.010 
(0.12) 9.33*** 9.95*** 
abCF 0.000 (0.95) 
0.000 
(0.91) 
0.002 
(0.81) 
0.002 
(0.73) 
0.004 
(0.35) 
0.003 
(0.56) 
0.001 
(0.77) 
0.000 
(0.89) 0.73 1.74 
abPC 0.003 (0.61) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
0.004 
(0.39) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
0.001 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.95) 
0.002 
(0.87) 
0.001 
(0.63) 0.22 1.56 
abDE 0.000 (0.82) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
-0.003 
(0.66) 
-0.002 
(0.86) 
0.000 
(0.95) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
0.003 
(0.64) 
0.003 
(0.55) 1.53 2.34 
Panel B. Earnings management in year t = 0 
DAMJ 0.000 (0.89) 
0.000 
(0.94) 
0.007* 
(0.05) 
0.005* 
(0.08) 
-0.026*** 
(0.00) 
-0.021*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004 
(0.32) 
-0.002 
(0.67) 25.75*** 20.19*** 
DAKW 0.003 (0.52) 
0.002 
(0.69) 
0.009** 
(0.02) 
0.010** 
(0.02) 
-0.025*** 
(0.00) 
-0.026*** 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.29) 
-0.004 
(0.51) 18.80*** 14.51*** 
abCF 0.000 (0.95) 
0.000 
(0.91) 
-0.001 
(0.87) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
0.002 
(0.69) 
0.000 
(0.95) 
-0.001 
(0.73) 
-0.000 
(0.89) 0.42 1.80 
abPC 0.002 (0.78) 
0.003 
(0.56) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
-0.001 
(0.85) 
0.000 
(0.98) 
-0.000 
(0.93) 
-0.001 
(0.77) 0.58 1.83 
abDE 0.000 (0.98) 
-0.001 
(0.66) 
-0.000 
(0.85) 
0.001 
(0.83) 
-0.014** 
(0.04) 
-0.011* 
(0.06) 
-0.004 
(0.41) 
-0.003 
(0.60) 4.52** 4.16* 
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Table 4: Results of Difference Tests in Earnings Management around CEO Turnover (continued) 
 
 
Type 1 
(n = 193) 
Type 2 
(n = 29) 
Type 3 
(n = 46) 
Type 4 
(n = 49) Difference test 
Variables Mean (p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) 
Mean 
(p-value) 
Median 
(p-value) F-value Chi-sq 
Panel C. Earnings management in year t = +1 
DAMJ 0.003 (0.52) 
0.004 
(0.47) 
0.003 
(0.61) 
0.003 
(0.55) 
0.006 
(0.35) 
0.007 
(0.28) 
0.004 
(0.42) 
0.005 
(0.30) 0.38 1.73 
DAKW 0.003 (0.49) 
0.000 
(0.92) 
0.004 
(0.56) 
0.003 
(0.61) 
0.005 
(0.32) 
0.005 
(0.39) 
0.002 
(0.57) 
0.002 
(0.63) 0.96 1.65 
abCF -0.001 (0.78) 
-0.001 
(0.81) 
-0.002 
(0.65) 
-0.001 
(0.84) 
-0.002 
(0.67) 
-0.001 
(0.83) 
-0.001 
(0.75) 
-0.000 
(0.82) 0.58 1.34 
abPC 0.000 (0.83) 
0.001 
(0.76) 
0.000 
(0.91) 
0.000 
(0.97) 
-0.000 
(0.93) 
-0.000 
(0.95) 
-0.002 
(0.64) 
-0.001 
(0.73) 0.22 0.62 
abDE 0.000 (0.92) 
0.000 
(0.93) 
0.002 
(0.69) 
0.001 
(0.85) 
-0.001 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(0.98) 
0.001 
(0.86) 
0.000 
(0.95) 0.73 1.66 
Note: The difference tests are based on parametric ANOVA as well as non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: CEO Turnover Models - First Stage Probit Estimation 
 
Dependent variables 
CEOTOV 1 CEOTOV 2 CEOTOV 3 CEOTOV 4 
Intercept -0.359 (-2.05)** 
-0.446 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.456 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.636* 
(-1.79) 
-0.438 
(-1.70)* 
-0.436 
(-1.76)*  
-0.637 
(-1.69)* 
-0.630 
(-1.67)* 
-0.862 
(-2.30)*** 
-0.483 
(-3.07)*** 
-0.437 
(-2.95)*** 
adjROAt-1 
-0.261 
(-1.53)   
-0.335 
(-1.46)   
-0.533 
(-2.93)***   
-0.509 
(-2.65)***   
adjROAt 
-0.282 
(-1.81)*   
-0.393 
(-1.74)*   
-0.627 
(-3.28)***   
-0.962 
(-3.88)***   
SGt-1 
 
-0.458 
(-1.79)*   
-0.267 
(-1.76)*   
-0.278 
(-2.74)***   
-0.454 
(-2.57)***  
SGt 
 
-0.549 
(-2.09)**   
-0.234 
(-1.81)*   
-0.303 
(-3.15)***   
-0.386 
(-2.15)**  
adjSRt-1 
  
-0.183 
(-1.53)   
-0.186 
(-1.45)   
-0.265 
(-1.74)*   
-0.277 
(-2.53)*** 
adjSRt 
  
-0.226 
(-1.81)*   
-0.192 
(-1.73)*   
-0.396 
(-2.95)***   
-0.293 
(-2.77)*** 
OWN -0.488 (-4.12)*** 
-0.488 
(-4.13)*** 
-0.486 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.419 
(-4.01)*** 
-0.381 
(-3.99)*** 
-0.386 
(-3.86)*** 
-0.501 
(-4.15)*** 
-0.562 
(-4.27)*** 
-0.574 
(-4.40)*** 
-0.455 
(-4.05)*** 
-0.307 
(-3.84)*** 
-0.256 
(-3.79)*** 
CHAEBOL 0.348 (2.58)*** 
0.337 
(2.50)*** 
0.333 
(2.46)*** 
-0.761 
(-1.16) 
-0.742 
(-1.14) 
-0.945 
(-1.43) 
0.142 
(1.79)* 
0.124 
(1.72)* 
0.107 
(1.68)* 
-0.011 
(-0.27) 
-0.092 
(-0.41) 
-0.109 
(-0.45) 
OUTSIDE 0.116 (1.28) 
0.108 
(1.16) 
0.113 
(1.20) 
0.103 
(1.08) 
0.102 
(1.08) 
0.095 
(0.92) 
0.136 
(1.25) 
0.135 
(1.26) 
0.129 
(1.17) 
0.104 
(1.03) 
0.092 
(0.87) 
0.086 
(0.81) 
BLOCK 2.026 (1.81)* 
1.978 
(1.79)* 
1.952 
(1.77)* 
2.917 
(2.59)*** 
2.169 
(2.51)*** 
3.889 
(2.47)*** 
2.522 
(2.52)*** 
2.875 
(2.70)*** 
2.764 
(2.56)*** 
2.992 
(2.91)*** 
2.948 
(2.89)*** 
2.781 
(2.73)*** 
FOR 0.842 (1.16) 
0.875 
(1.22) 
0.881 
(1.22) 
0.303 
(1.91)* 
0.382 
(1.95)* 
0.304 
(1.93)* 
0.613 
(1.72)* 
0.745 
(2.09)** 
0.724 
(2.07)** 
0.456 
(1.52) 
0.281 
(1.48) 
0.383 
(1.23) 
LEV 0.253 (0.81) 
0.306 
(0.98) 
0.298 
(0.95) 
0.185 
(1.30) 
0.183 
(1.27) 
0.290 
(1.35) 
0.243 
(1.03) 
0.215 
(0.93) 
0.212 
(1.31) 
0.377 
(2.70)*** 
0.396 
(3.37)*** 
0.304 
(3.32)*** 
No. of turnovers 193 193 193 29 29 29 46 46 46 49 49 49 
No. of observation 579 579 579 87 87 87 138 138 138 147 147 147 
Estrella R-square 0.1708 0.1742 0.1701 0.2716 0.2759 0.2689 0.4472 0.4233 0.4082 0.3617 0.3412 0.3229 
Note: t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 6: Earnings Management around Type 1 CEO Turnovers – Second-stage OLS Estimation 
 
 Dependent variables 
Event year t = -1   t = 0 
 DAKW abCF abPC abDE   DAKW abCF abPC abDE 
Intercept 0.036 0.126* -0.553*** -0.168**   -0.035 -0.027 -0.157** -0.108* 
CEOTOV 0.025 0.032 0.035 0.027   0.031 0.028 0.039 0.034 
OWN 0.011 0.053 0.021 0.034   0.025 0.023 0.018 0.019 
CHAEBOL -0.089*** -0.058*** -0.122*** -0.131***   -0.046* -0.032* -0.069** -0.054** 
OUTSIDE -0.011 0.013 -0.004 -0.009   -0.020 -0.014 0.003 -0.016 
BLOCK -0.164*** -0.258* -0.239** -0.196**   -0.145** -0.175** -0.144** -0.135** 
FOR 0.030 0.043 0.018 0.017   0.011 -0.023 -0.010 0.028 
CEOTOV×OWN 0.086 0.017 0.066 0.021   0.035 0.014 0.015 0.009 
CEOTOV×CHAEBOL -0.112* -0.018 -0.078 -0.156*   -0.037* -0.027 -0.059* -0.045* 
CEOTOV×OUTSIDE -0.109 -0.132 -0.147 -0.128   -0.015 -0.013 0.004 -0.007 
CEOTOV×BLOCK -0.187** -0.258* -0.139* -0.176**   -0.127* -0.115* -0.107* -0.112* 
CEOTOV×FOR 0.059 0.062 0.096 0.017   0.007 -0.012 -0.013 -0.008 
SIZE -0.245** -0.152* -0.139** -0.178**   -0.256*** -0.207** -0.266*** 0.366*** 
LEV 0.523** 0.425** 0.303*** 0.479***   0.422** 0.491*** 0.445*** 0.465*** 
BIG4 -0.011 -0.031 -0.017 -0.006   -0.034 -0.036 -0.016 -0.013 
ROA 0.110* -0.100* -0.008 0.011   0.142** -0.242*** -0.179** -0.209** 
LAG TAC 0.102      0.073*    
MILLS -0.409*** -0.163* -0.320*** -0.154**   -0.141* 0.107* -0.265*** -0.239*** 
CEOTOV×MILLS -0.301*** -0.406** -0.146* -0.195**   -0.179* -0.264** 0.227** 0.175* 
No. of turnovers 193 193 193 193   193 193 193 193 
No. of observation 579 579 579 579   579 579 579 579 
Adj R- square 0.1794 0.1141 0.1327 0.1618   0.1273 0.1195 0.1295 0.1278 
F-value 17.89** 14.30** 15.62*** 16.19***   14.91*** 14.69*** 15.02*** 14.96*** 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Earnings Management around Type 2 CEO Turnovers – Second-stage OLS Estimation 
 
 Dependent variables 
Event year t =-1   t =0 
 DAKW abCF abPC abDE   DAKW abCF abPC abDE 
Intercept 0.510** 0.234* 0.239* 0.398**   0.322** -0.043 -0.067 0.282** 
CEOTOV 0.075 0.098 0.028 0.042   0.149** 0.017 -0.014 0.013 
OWN 0.051 0.043 0.061 0.045   0.041 -0.048 0.037 0.062 
CHAEBOL -0.071 -0.075 -0.046 -0.058   -0.039 -0.055 -0.047 -0.041 
OUTSIDE 0.020 0.001 -0.013 0.016   -0.104** -0.016 -0.029 -0.018 
BLOCK -0.133** -0.160** -0.195** -0.231***   -0.206*** -0.183** -0.149* -0.142* 
FOR -0.044 -0.019 -0.023 -0.025   -0.015 -0.024 -0.029 -0.020 
CEOTOV×OWN 0.040 0.035 0.042 0.065   0.013 -0.005 0.012 0.033 
CEOTOV×CHAEBOL -0.076 -0.029 -0.064 -0.018   -0.029 -0.009 -0.015 -0.010 
CEOTOV×OUTSIDE -0.028 -0.013 -0.010 -0.020   -0.059** -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
CEOTOV×BLOCK -0.083* -0.049* -0.102** -0.205**   -0.065** -0.057** -0.052* -0.043* 
CEOTOV×FOR -0.107 -0.070 -0.083 -0.013   -0.001 -0.011 -0.016 -0.006 
SIZE -0.325*** -0.298*** -0.268*** -0.309***   -0.204** -0.242*** -0.309*** -0.276*** 
LEV 0.531*** 0.278** 0.340*** 0.473***   0.315*** 0.395*** 0.443*** 0.403*** 
BIG4 -0.035 0.023 0.042 0.059   -0.016 -0.068 -0.038 0.019 
ROA 0.051* 0.061* 0.025 -0.019   0.014* 0.064* -0.034* -0.062* 
LAG TAC 0.132      0.156*    
MILLS -0.127* -0.125 -0.198* -0.151*   -0.109* -0.167** 0.029 -0.132* 
CEOTOV×MILLS 0.211** 0.129* 0.237** -0.133*   -0.245** -0.270*** 0.037 -0.092 
No. of turnovers 29 29 29 29   29 29 29 29 
No. of observation 87 87 87 87   87 87 87 87 
Adj. R-square 0.2850 0.2236 0.2991 0.2864   0.3309 0.2794 0.1969 0.2690 
F-value 8.67*** 7.19*** 8.82*** 8.76***   11.02*** 8.15*** 6.11*** 7.93*** 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Earnings Management around Type 3 CEO Turnovers – Second-stage OLS Estimation 
 
 Dependent variables 
Event year t =-1   t =0 
 DAKW abCF abPC abDE   DAKW abCF abPC abDE 
Intercept -0.166 -0.149* -0.273* 0.164   0.195* 0.125 -0.237* -0.219* 
CEOTOV 0.136** 0.011 0.016 0.025   -0.242*** -0.002 -0.019 -0.165** 
OWN 0.097 0.068 0.071 0.090   0.027 -0.010 0.017 0.055 
CHAEBOL -0.063** -0.059* -0.064** -0.124**   -0.140* -0.016 -0.037 -0.049* 
OUTSIDE -0.013* -0.007 -0.010 -0.017   -0.011* -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 
BLOCK -0.172** -0.141** -0.193** -0.195**   -0.126** -0.107** -0.117** -0.180** 
FOR -0.046 -0.018 -0.027 -0.019   -0.028 -0.015 -0.003 -0.016 
CEOTOV×OWN 0.026 0.014 0.019 0.064   0.013 -0.006 0.002 0.011 
CEOTOV×CHAEBOL -0.053* -0.037* -0.047* -0.094**   -0.091* -0.015 -0.010 -0.013 
CEOTOV×OUTSIDE -0.011* -0.008 -0.008 -0.003   -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 -0.004 
CEOTOV×BLOCK -0.125** -0.103* -0.156** -0.163**   -0.005 -0.083* -0.073* -0.096* 
CEOTOV×FOR -0.014 -0.005 -0.018 -0.019   -0.013 -0.009 -0.000 -0.011 
SIZE -0.293*** -0.248*** -0.287*** -0.211***   -0.239*** -0.151** -0.186** -2.303*** 
LEV 0.108** 0.260*** 0.182*** 0.215***   0.350*** 0.279*** 0.107** 0.263*** 
BIG4 -0.012 -0.009 0.015 0.014   -0.007 -0.011 -0.018 -0.008 
ROA 0.064* 0.123** 0.041 -0.088   0.041* -0.137** -0.002 0.130* 
LAG TAC -0.156**      0.094*    
MILLS -0.111** -0.053 -0.095** -0.104**   -0.130** 0.010 -0.106** -0.107** 
CEOTOV×MILLS -0.158*** -0.146** -0.183*** 0.167**   0.237*** -0.008 0.085 0.194*** 
No. of turnovers 46 46 46 46   46 46 46 46 
No. of observation 138 138 138 138   138 138 138 138 
Adj. R-square 0.3385 0.2373 0.2880 0.2421   0.3763 0.1604 0.1647 0.2832 
F-value 10.91*** 8.15*** 8.67*** 8.36***   11.54*** 5.53*** 5.65*** 8.54*** 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Earnings Management around Type 4 CEO Turnovers – Second-stage OLS Estimation 
 
 Dependent variables 
Event year t =-1   t =0 
 DAKW abCF abPC abDE   DAKW abCF abPC abDE 
Intercept 0.036 -0.136* -0.064 0.152*   -0.165* -0.113 -0.159* 0.145* 
CEOTOV 0.014 0.043 0.013 0.019   -0.013 -0.003 -0.029 -0.020 
OWN 0.065 0.034 0.035 0.033   0.072 0.026 0.019 -0.010 
CHAEBOL -0.067 -0.023 -0.029 -0.039   -0.002 -0.017 -0.013 -0.022 
OUTSIDE -0.019 -0.011 -0.016 -0.012   -0.020 -0.004 -0.008 -0.083* 
BLOCK -0.192** -0.152* -0.351*** -0.364***   -0.126* -0.108* -0.242** -0.207** 
FOR 0.043 -0.032 -0.048 -0.061*   -0.013 -0.024 -0.009 -0.006 
CEOTOV×OWN 0.008 0.011 0.031 0.017   0.010 0.008 0.002 -0.003 
CEOTOV×CHAEBOL -0.014 -0.015 -0.019 -0.017   -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011 
CEOTOV×OUTSIDE -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.010   -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.026 
CEOTOV×BLOCK -0.157** -0.113* -0.161** -0.224**   -0.086 -0.027 -0.102* -0.099* 
CEOTOV×FOR 0.099 0.051 0.062 0.041   -0.007 0.009 -0.005 -0.003 
SIZE -0.268*** -0.120** -0.178*** -0.301***   -0.214*** -0.311*** -0.297*** -0.257*** 
LEV 0.260*** 0.322*** 0.261*** 0.287***   0.317*** 0.220*** 0.243*** 0.254*** 
BIG4 -0.037 -0.012 -0.012 -0.019   -0.018 -0.002 0.013 0.015 
ROA 0.160** -0.078* -0.040 0.157**   0.147** -0.017 0.192** 0.025 
LAG TAC -0.031      -0.132*    
MILLS -0.079 -0.058 -0.125** -0.020*   -0.133** -0.104* -0.135** 0.029 
CEOTOV×MILLS -0.112* 0.054 -0.164** -0.129**   -0.105* 0.080 -0.163** -0.018 
No. of turnovers 49 49 49 49   49 49 49 49 
No. of observation 147 147 147 147   147 147 147 147 
Adj. R-square 0.1765 0.1632 0.1708 0.1877   0.1646 0.1503 0.1625 0.1722 
F-value 8.09*** 7.38*** 7.96*** 8.54***   7.46*** 6.82*** 7.29*** 8.00*** 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
